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Among modern interpreters, it has become a commonplace to regard the classical 
Greeks as a “people of the eye”1 with a general predilection for the visual sense. One 
of the most prominent facets of this alleged Greek visuality is the predominance of 
optical terms and metaphors in the Greek language and particularly in its 
philosophical terminology, extending to its most fundamental concepts such as ἰδέα 
‘aspect,’ ‘look,’ or ‘visible figure’, οἶδα ‘to know’ (= ‘to have seen’), and θεωρία 
‘contemplation’ (the disinterested look of the spectator).2 Undoubtedly the most 
influential interpretations of Greek thought as a metaphysics of vision and visibility, 
and of the implicit understanding of being underlying this imagery, are those of 
Martin Heidegger, who develops his readings into a critical account of the 
foundations of the Western metaphysical tradition as a whole. In his most important 
texts, Heidegger accordingly seeks alternative images and terms in order to 
                                                          
1 A prominent characterization of the ancient Greeks as Augenmenschen, “eye-people,” can be found in 
Bruno Snell, Die Ausdrücke für den Begriff des Wissens in der vorplatonischen Philosophie, (Philologische 
Untersuchungen) 29 (Berlin, 1924), p. 69. 
2 For a comprehensive list of Greek optical terms, see Charles Mugler, Dictionnaire historique de la 
terminologie optique des Grecs: douze siècles de dialogues avec la lumière (Paris, 1964). 
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contribute to a genuinely post-metaphysical approach to intelligibility and its 
correlation with the human being’s capacity to encounter and constitute meaning.3 
Heidegger’s narrative of Greek metaphysics is focused on Plato and Aristotle 
and retains a sharp distinction between pre-Platonic and post-Platonic philosophy. 
While the pre-Platonic thinkers of the “first beginning” of philosophy—first and 
foremost, Anaximander of Miletus (flourished ca. 600 BC), Parmenides of Elea (fl. ca. 
500 BC), and Heraclitus of Ephesus (fl. ca. 500 BC)4—were not yet “metaphysical” 
thinkers in Heidegger’s sense, they prefigured the Platonic and Aristotelian 
hierarchical and systematic ontologies (described by Heidegger as the “first 
completion of the first beginning”5) in important ways and can therefore be 
designated as “pre-” or “proto-metaphysical.” Nonetheless, some of the key elements 
that Heidegger singles out as emblematic of Platonism are largely absent from the 
pre-Platonics. Notably, the understanding of the intuitive intellect, νοῦς, as a kind of 
immediate nonsensory vision, as well as the associated use of optical and ocular 
terminology to characterize thinking and intelligibility, are primarily Platonic 
innovations that emerge together with the Platonic Idea as a fundamental 
philosophical concept. 
In this essay, we will first take a look at the background and the key theses of 
the Heideggerian account of Greek “metaphysics of sight” as it is manifested in 
                                                          
3 For studies of Heidegger’s reappropriation and critique of Greek optical metaphysics, see David 
Michael Levin, The Opening of Vision: Nihilism and the Postmodern Situation (London, 1988); “Decline 
and Fall: Ocularcentrism in Heidegger’s Reading of the History of Metaphysics,” in Modernity and the 
Hegemony of Vision, ed. David Michael Levin (Berkeley, CA, 1993), pp. 186–217; William McNeill, The 
Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory (Albany, NY, 1999).  
4 I make no attempt here to order Heraclitus and Parmenides chronologically; it seems most probable 
that they were roughly contemporaries and unaware of each other. Heraclitus is often regarded as the 
older of the two, but their standard birth dates are based on Diogenes Laertius’s biographies, the 
sources of which Hermann Diels has shown to have been conventional and unreliable, and on the 
obviously fictitious description of Parmenides in Plato’s Parmenides. See Plato, Parmenides, in Platonis 
opera, ed. John Burnet, 2 (Oxford, 1901), 127b1–c5; Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, 2 vols., ed. 
Herbert S. Long (Oxford, 1964), 9.1.2–3; Hermann Diels, “Chronologische Untersuchungen über 
Apollodors Chronika,” Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 31 (1876), 33–36. See also John Burnet, Early 
Greek Philosophy, 4th ed. (London, 1948), pp. 169–170. 
5 Martin Heidegger, Besinnung, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main, 1997), p. 
383; Mindfulness, trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (London, 2006), p. 339. 
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Platonic thought; we will use the Heideggerian readings as a guideline and source of 
inspiration without concurring with all of their interpretive theses.6 On this basis, we 
can proceed to investigate the extent to which this account applies to the pre-Platonic 
texts, particularly to the fragments of Heraclitus and Parmenides. Is there a primacy 
of vision and the visual, or of any of the other senses, before Plato? What is the 
relationship between thinking and the senses in pre-Platonic philosophy? 
Considering these questions will enable us to trace the initial context and function of 
the visualization of thinking and to thus draft a provisional genealogy of ocular 
metaphysics. 
 
1. In an Ideal Light: Heidegger and the Platonic Metaphysics of Sight 
One of the first modern thinkers to explicitly regard Greek philosophy as a 
“metaphysics of sight”—and to attack it for precisely that reason—was Martin 
Luther, whose largely implicit but decisive influence on the young Heidegger has 
been studied by John van Buren and other scholars.7 In his quest to release Christian 
theology from the yoke of Aristotelian scholasticism, accompanied by his well-
known diatribes against “the blind pagan master” Aristotle,8 Luther contrasted the 
metaphysical concentration on immediate “visibility,” in the sense of intelligible 
presence to immediate intuitive apprehension, with the Pauline emphasis that the 
                                                          
6 One particularly problematic facet of Heidegger’s readings of Heraclitus and Parmenides, and one 
that we will not discuss here, is his notion of φύσις, in the sense of “appearing” and “emerging into 
presence,” as their basic word, even though the term is very sparsely attested in either thinker. Martin 
Heidegger, Metaphysik und Nihilismus, ed. Hans-Joachim Friedrich (Frankfurt am Main, 1999), p. 89: 
“[T]he thinking of Heraclitus and Parmenides is a ‘physics’ in the sense of a conceiving of the essence 
of φύσις as the being of beings.” 
7 See John van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King (Bloomington, IN, 1994), pp. 157–
202; “Martin Heidegger, Martin Luther,” in Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest 
Thought, ed. Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (Albany, NY, 1994), pp. 159–174, 439–442. See also 
Christian Sommer, Heidegger, Aristote, Luther: les sources aristotéliciennes et néo-testamentaires d’Être et 
Temps (Paris, 2005); Benjamin D. Crowe, Heidegger’s Religious Origins: Destruction and Authenticity 
(Bloomington, IN, 2006). 
8 See Luther’s 1520 open letter “To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation”; Martin Luther, 
Werke: Kritische Gesammtausgabe, 6 (Weimar, 1888), p. 457; Three Treatises (Philadelphia, 1970), pp. 92–
93. See also van Buren, The Young Heidegger, p. 163; “Martin Heidegger, Martin Luther,” p. 171. 
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Christian “goes about by faith [πίστεως], not by sight [εἴδους].”9 For Luther, “the 
kingdom of Christ is a hearing kingdom [hoer Reich], not a seeing kingdom [sehe 
Reich]. For the eyes do not guide and lead us to discover Christ and to learn to know 
him, but this is a task for the ears [. . .].”10 In his 1515–16 lectures on Paul’s epistle to 
the Romans, Luther notes that while “philosophers and metaphysicians [. . .] so 
immerse their eye [oculum] in the present state of things [praesentiam rerum] that they 
speculate [speculentur] only on their quiddities and qualities,” the apostle Paul “turns 
our eyes away from beholding [intuitu] things as they are now [. . .] and directs us to 
regard them in terms of what they will be.”11 This contrast was relevant for Luther’s 
distinction, in his 1518 Heidelberg Disputation, between the intellectual “theology of 
glory” that considers the “invisible things” of the revelation to be intelligible and 
manifest in the inherent qualities of actual things and works, and the “theology of the 
cross,” which regards even visible things in terms of faith in “the cross,” i.e., in the 
transcendent activity of divine grace.12 
In the post-Hegelian era, the Lutheran critique of Greek metaphysics was 
reappropriated by Count Paul Yorck von Wartenburg, Wilhelm Dilthey’s friend and 
collaborator and one of the founding figures of philosophical hermeneutics. In the 
historical and hermeneutical “psychology of life” outlined in his Bewusstseinsstellung 
und Geschichte (State of consciousness and history, 1892–97), Count Yorck describes 
“ocularity” as a key feature of Greek philosophy: 
                                                          
9 2 Cor. 5:7; Novum Testamentum Graece, ed. Eberhard Nestle et al., 27th ed. (Stuttgart, 1993).  
10 In a sermon at Merseburg on August 6, 1545; Martin Luther, Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, 51 
(Weimar, 1914), p. 11. See R. Konersmann, C. Wilson, and A. von der Lühe, “Sehen,” in Historisches 
Wörterbuch der Philosophie, ed. Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer, 9 (Darmstadt, 1995), p. 123. 
11 Martin Luther, Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, 56: Die Vorlesung über den Römerbrief (Weimar, 1938), 
p. 371; Lectures on Romans, trans. Wilhelm Pauck (Louisville, KY, 2006), p. 235. Translation modified. 
See van Buren, The Young Heidegger, p. 198; “Martin Heidegger, Martin Luther,” p. 168; Thomas 
Sheehan, “Heidegger’s ‘Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion,’ 1920–21,” The Personalist 60 
(1979), 322. 
12 Martin Luther, Werke: Kritische Gesammtausgabe, 1 (Weimar, 1883), pp. 353–365; Martin Luther’s Basic 
Theological Writings, ed. Timothy F. Lull and William R. Russell, 3rd ed. (Minneapolis, MN, 2012), pp. 
14–25. See van Buren, The Young Heidegger, pp. 157–168; “Martin Heidegger, Martin Luther,” pp. 161, 
167. 
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Making the totality of givenness [Gesamtgegebenheit] visible and evident is the 
manner and motif of the Greek way of thought; its historicity consists in this 
adjudication of self-consciousness that liberates ocularity [Okularität] and grants 
it independence in order to thus acquire an organ for mastering givenness.13  
 
Yorck argues that the very foundations of Platonic and Aristotelian thought—the 
category of “substance” (οὐσία), the notion of theoretical contemplation as the 
supreme aim of human activity, as well as the Platonic Idea as such—are rooted in a 
“liberation of ocularity from all other sensuality” and in the notion of beholding 
(Schauung) as the fundamental intellectual activity.14 Like Luther, Yorck sees in the 
emergence of Christianity a decisive break with the optical imagery of Greek 
metaphysics, leading to the breakthrough of a radical new sense of temporality and 
historicity.15 
Heidegger was familiar with Yorck’s work only through the latter’s 
correspondence with Dilthey (first published in 1923), but the ideas expressed there 
had an immediate impact on Heidegger’s Being and Time,16 which emphatically 
quotes a passage where Yorck notes the provenance of metaphysical words from 
ocularity and the need to seek alternative expressions.17 On the basis of his readings 
                                                          
13 Paul Yorck von Wartenburg, Bewusstseinsstellung und Geschichte, ed. Iring Fetscher, (Philosophische 
Bibliothek) 442 (Hamburg, 1991), p. 85. 
14 Yorck, Bewusstseinsstellung, pp. 61–62, 67. Cf. Ingo Farin, "Count Paul Yorck von Wartenburg", in The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/yorck/>.  
15 Yorck, Bewusstseinsstellung, p. 43–44. 
16 See the section dedicated to Count Yorck in Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 18th ed. (Tübingen, 
2001), pp. 397–404; Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh, revised by Dennis Schmidt (Albany, NY, 
2010), pp. 377–384. See also Martin Heidegger, Der Begriff der Zeit (Frankfurt am Main, 2004), pp. 3–15; 
The Concept of Time: The First Draft of Being and Time, trans. Ingo Farin (London, 2011), pp. 1–10.  
17 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, pp. 402–403; Being and Time, p. 382. The quotation is from Briefwechsel 
zwischen Wilhelm Dilthey und dem Grafen Paul Yorck von Wartenburg 1877–1897, ed. Erich Rothacker, 
(Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften) 1 (Halle, 1923), pp. 70–71. 
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of Augustine’s notion of concupiscentia oculorum, “the desire of the eyes,”18 and 
Aristotle’s description of the human being’s constitutive urge to know (εἰδέναι, 
literally, ‘to have seen’), evidenced by the privilege of the sense of vision,19 Heidegger 
develops his existential account of “curiosity” (Neugier) as the desire to see more.20 
This analysis involves the historical thesis that the Western philosophical tradition 
has basically understood being in terms of that which shows itself to immediate 
intellectual vision or intuition: 
 
Being is what shows itself in pure, intuitive perception [Vernehmen], and only 
this seeing [Sehen] discovers being. Primordial and genuine truth lies in pure 
intuition [Anschauung]. This thesis henceforth remains the foundation of 
Western philosophy.21 
 
This notion is an aspect of Heidegger’s more general claim that the tradition has 
understood being in terms of the model of constant presence (beständige Anwesenheit) 
which posits as a standard of being that which most constantly shows itself to pure 
apprehending or encountering-as-present (Gegenwärtigen).22 In this account, the 
Western metaphysics of sight is rooted in a metaphysics of presence. As Heidegger 
explains in his 1940 lecture course on European Nihilism, the classical Greeks were a 
“visual” people, a people “of the eye” (Augenmenschen), not by virtue of some 
                                                          
18 Augustine, Confessions, in Patrologia Latina, ed. Jacques Paul Migne, 32 (Paris, 1845), 10.35.54–57; see 
Martin Heidegger, Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens, ed. Matthias Jung, Thomas Regehly, and 
Claudius Strube (Frankfurt am Main, 1995), pp. 218–227; The Phenomenology of Religious Life, trans. 
Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei (Bloomington, IN, 2004), pp. 162–169. 
19 Aristotle, Metaphysics, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford, 1924), 980a21–27; see Martin Heidegger, 
Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik, ed. 
Günther Neumann (Frankfurt am Main, 2005), pp. 56–113, 387–390. 
20 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, pp. 170–173; Being and Time, pp. 164–167. See Martin Heidegger, 
Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, ed. Petra Jaeger, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), pp. 378–
384; History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington, IN, 1992), pp. 
274–277. 
21 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 171; Being and Time, p. 165. 
22 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 26; Being and Time, pp. 24–25.  
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contingent psychological or cultural peculiarity but because of their fundamental 
metaphysical outlook for which the fundamental criterion of “to be” was presence, in 
the sense of accessibility to immediate apprehending: 
 
Because being [Sein] means presence [Anwesenheit] and constancy 
[Beständigkeit], “seeing” is especially apt to serve as an elucidation for the 
grasping of what is present and what is permanent. In seeing, we have the 
perceived “over against” [gegenüber] us in an emphatic sense, provided that an 
interpretation of beings [Seienden] does not already underlie our seeing. The 
Greeks did not explain relations with beings through seeing because they were 
“visual people” [Augenmenschen]; they were “visual people,” so to speak, 
because they experienced the being of beings as presence and constancy.23 
 
Seeing is the paradigmatic metaphysical sense because it is affords a particular kind 
of access to beings as present. What is it that distinguishes visual access from that 
provided by the other senses? Vision is not the most immediate form of sensory 
access; as Aristotle emphasizes in De anima, vision precisely requires distance, a 
transparent medium of visibility between the visual organ and the visual object.24 
Touch is more immediate in the sense that there is no spatial gap and no clearly 
defined limit between that which touches and that which is touched. Somewhat 
problematically, Aristotle takes the bodily flesh itself to be the medium of touching, 
conjecturing that the actual organ of the tactile sense must be something internal to 
the body25, but in Metaphysics 9.10, describing the simple intuitive apprehending of 
non-discursive truths as the most immediate form of access, he takes recourse 
                                                          
23 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, 6th ed., 2 (Stuttgart, 1998), p. 199; Nietzsche, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, 
ed. David Farrell Krell, 4 (San Francisco, 1991), p. 167. Tr. mod. 
24 Aristotle, De anima, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford, 1961), 419a12–21. 
25 Aristotle, De anima, 422b17–423b26. 
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precisely to a tactile metaphor (θιγεῖν or θιγγάνειν ‘to touch upon’).26 Hearing, on 
the other hand, is the proper vehicle of learning and understanding;27 as the linguistic 
sense, it gives us access not only to particular sounds but also to universal λόγος in 
the form of general discourses, concepts, rules, and narratives. What, for Plato, 
distinguishes vision from the other senses is its “sharpness” (ὀξύτης),28 i.e., its 
determinacy: vision gives us a privileged kind of access to the limits of things, their 
colors, contours, and shapes, and thus discloses them as distinct, definite, and 
delimited. As Heidegger puts it: 
 
The ancients considered that things are given most completely in seeing, 
namely in their immediate presentness [Gegenwart], indeed in such a way that 
the present being has the character which, for the Greeks, belongs to every 
being: πέρας, i.e., it is limited [begrenzt] by its firmly circumscribed look 
[Aussehen], its figure [Gestalt].29  
 
Aristotle accordingly notes that vision is the source of a great number of distinctions 
(διαφοραί):30 our visual field is more clearly and intricately differentiated than our 
auditory or tactile fields. Unlike touching, seeing also makes a clear distinction 
between that which senses and that which is sensed. Vision is the “objectifying” 
sense par excellence since, as Heidegger puts it, it discloses what is seen as “over 
against” or “opposite” (gegenüber) the one who sees—as something separate, at a 
distance.  
As the path of access to things as distinct, definite, and separate, vision is the 
sensory paradigm of the Platonic Idea in the sense of the determinate and distinct 
                                                          
26 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1051b22–25.  
27 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 980b21–25. 
28 Plato, Phaedrus, in Platonis opera, 2, 250d3–4. 
29 Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet, ed. Hermann 
Mörchen, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main, 1997), p. 102; The Essence of Truth: On Plato’s Cave Allegory and 
Theaetetus, trans. Ted Sadler (London, 2004), p. 74. Tr. mod. 
30 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 980a26–27. 
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identity, the “what it is,” of each kind of thing, as the figure or form that sets things 
of the type P apart from other things as being P and not Q:  
 
The word ἰδέα means that which is seen [das Gesichtete] in the visible 
[Sichtbaren], the view [Anblick] that something offers. What is offered is the 
respective look [Aussehen] or εἶδος of whatever is encountered. The look of a 
thing is that within which, as we say, it presents [präsentiert] itself to us, re-
presents itself [sich vor-stellt] and as such stands before us. The look is that 
within which and as which the thing presences [an-west]—that is, in the Greek 
sense, is. [. . .] In the look, that which is present [Anwesende], that which is 
[Seiende], stands there in its whatness [Was] and its howness [Wie]. It is 
perceived and taken, it is possessed and had by an accepting [Hinnehmens], it is 
the disposable presencing [Anwesende] of what is present: οὐσία.31 
 
As the whatness that makes a being visible as the specific and distinct being that it is, 
the ἰδέα provides the delimiting outline of the being, the limit that identifies this 
being as what it is and differentiates it from what it is not. However, in the Platonic 
approach, this differentiating identity is at the same time essentially discursive and 
conceptual. As Socrates puts it in Book 6 of the Republic, even though beauty is 
spoken of in the plural in the sense that we attribute it to many numerically different 
things, the “what it is” (ὃ ἔστιν) thus predicated—the beautiful itself—is in each case 
one and the same. The many beautiful things can be seen with the eyes (ὁρᾶσθαι); 
beauty as such can only be intuitively grasped (νοεῖσθαι).32 The “what it is” is what 
lets every particular thing be seen as a distinct and particular kind of thing, but in 
order to do this, it must be a specific kind, a generic conceptual identity named by a 
                                                          
31 Martin Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, 6th ed. (Tübingen, 1998), p. 138; Introduction to 
Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven, CT, 2000), pp. 192–193. Tr. mod. 
32 Plato, Republic, in Platonis opera, ed. John Burnet, 4 (Oxford, 1902), 507b2–10. 
10 
 
single predicate.33 In order to become noetic vision, sensory vision must therefore be 
penetrated by the generality of conceptual discourse, which properly belongs to the 
realm of hearing; by itself, the visual sense is incapable of discovering the conceptual 
articulation underlying visual articulation. Socrates tells us in the Phaedo that it was 
this very discovery that discouraged him from pursuing the purely empirical study 
of nature: for fear that his soul might be “blinded” by the attempt to grasp things 
solely through the eyes and the other senses, he decided to continue his investigation 
into the truth of beings (τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν) by means of conceptual discourse 
(ἐν λόγοις).34 As Charles Kahn notes, “[t]he fundamental conception of the [Platonic] 
Forms is, from the beginning, linguistic rather than visual in its orientation [. . .]. 
[T]his conception is dominated not by the metaphor of seeing [. . .] but rather by the 
notion of essential Being as specified by the what-is-X? question.”35 Nonetheless, it 
would be hasty to conclude from this, with Kahn, that “[i]t is a mistake [. . .] to 
suppose [. . .] that the etymological connections of the terms idea and eidos with the 
verb idein, ‘to see,’ are in any way essential or decisive for Plato’s conception of the 
Forms.”36 Rather, the Platonic approach presupposes that vision, the access to beings 
as delimited and articulate, is discursively and conceptually structured. Seeing takes 
place through a conceptual framework and is thus permeated by hearing; vision and 
λόγος are inextricably intertwined. In Kant’s words, “thoughts without content are 
empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”37 
A fundamental reason for the generic nature of the Idea can be found in the 
way in which Plato often describes conceptual identities as functional identities, as 
particular functions or purposes in terms of which beings are ultimately identified as 
belonging to a particular kind of beings. These functions can obviously be fulfilled by 
                                                          
33 Plato, Republic, 596a6–7. 
34 Plato, Phaedo, in Platonis opera, ed. John Burnet, 1 (Oxford, 1900), 99e2–100a2. 
35 Charles H. Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form (Cambridge, 
1996), p. 355. 
36 Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, pp. 354–355. 
37 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. Jens Timmermann (Hamburg, 1998), A 51, B 75; 
Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 193–194. 
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several numerically distinct particular things.38 The type of looking involved in the 
ἰδέα or εἶδος as a “look” is thereby linked to a very specific context—that of 
production, ποίησις. The ἰδέα becomes the normative model, the paradigmatic 
example to which the craftsman looks for guidance in the process of implementing a 
specific kind of utensil in a particular material, and this looking is, of course, not a 
sensory one, but rather a “looking away” (ἀποβλέπειν) from the material at hand 
towards the ideal and immaterial function.39 This view of Platonic metaphysics as a 
“production ontology” is brought up by Heidegger in his 1949 Bremen lecture on The 
Thing:  
 
In the process of production [Herstellens], of course, the jug [Heidegger’s 
example in the lecture; J.B.] must first show its look [Aussehen] to the producer. 
But what shows itself here, the look (the εἶδος, the ἰδέα), characterizes the jug 
solely in the respect in which the vessel stands over against the producer as 
something to be produced. [. . .] Plato, who conceives of the presence of what is 
present in terms of the look, [. . .] experienced (decisively, indeed, for the 
sequel) [. . .] everything present as an object of producing.40 
 
The attribute constant in Heidegger’s reading of the Greek understanding of being as 
constant presence must therefore be emphasized. Constancy requires a degree of 
determinacy; sensory visual access to the material world of continuous change must 
be complemented by a noetic “looking away” towards the ideally permanent 
(functional) identity in terms of which a being can be identified in its “what it is.” In 
                                                          
38 See, e.g., Plato, Cratylus, in Platonis opera, 1, 389a5–390d6; Republic, 596a5–602b10.  
39 Plato, Cratylus, 390e1–4. 
40 Martin Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze, 9th ed. (Stuttgart, 2000), p. 160; Poetry, Language, Thought, 
trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York, 2001), p. 166. Tr. mod. See also Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge, ed. 
Petra Jaeger (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), p. 7; Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, trans. Andrew J. Mitchell 
(Bloomington, IN, 2012), pp. 7–8; Holzwege, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 8th ed. (Frankfurt 
am Main, 2003), pp. 13–14; Off the Beaten Track, trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge, 
2002), p. 10. 
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the Republic, Socrates shows that it is precisely the specific mediated character of 
vision that makes it the paradigmatic sense, structurally analogous to the intuitive 
intellect.41 In order to function, seeing, unlike the other senses, requires the presence 
of a third factor in addition to the eye and the object of sight: light, which, as 
Aristotle formulates it, is the actuality of the transparent medium of visibility as 
transparent.42 In an analogous manner, noetic insight into the ideal identities of 
things is possible only in terms of a third factor: the Idea of the Good (τὸ ἀγαθόν), 
that is, ideality as such. Just as the sun is the source of visibility, the Idea of ideality, 
that is, the inherent teleological structure through which beings are disclosed in 
terms of their purpose—of an ontological ideal of goodness in the sense of 
appropriateness or aptness—is the source of intelligibility that makes individual 
Ideas, individual purposes, intelligible. The sun is thus to be regarded as an offspring 
(ἔκγονος) and counterpart (ἀνάλογον) of the Good. Just as the Good stands to the 
intellect (νοῦς) and its objects (τὰ νοούμενα) in the purely intelligible sphere of 
intellectual vision (νοητός), the sun stands to sensory vision (ὄψις) and its objects 
(ὁρώμενα) in the sphere of sensuous visibility (ὁρατός):43  
 
In Greek thought τὸ ἀγαθόν means that which is fit for [taugt] something and 
enables another to be fit for [tauglich] something. [. . .] [T]he “Ideas” make 
something fit to appear in its whatness and thus to be present in its constancy 
[in seinem Beständigen]. [. . .] [W]hat makes every Idea fit to be an Idea—in a 
Platonic expression, the Idea of all Ideas—consists in making possible the 
appearing, in all its visibility, of everything present. [. . .] Therefore the Idea of 
Ideas is that which makes fit [das Tauglichmachende] as such, τὸ ἀγαθόν.44  
                                                          
41 Plato, Republic, 507c6–509c2. 
42 Aristotle, De anima, 418b4–20. 
43 Plato, Republic, 508b12–c2. 
44 Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt am Main, 
1996), pp. 227–228; Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 174–175 (trans. Thomas 
Sheehan). Tr. mod. 
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However, the sensuous and the intelligible are not simply two separate realms; 
rather, they are two intertwining components, two possible poles of orientation, of 
discursive vision. A central purpose of the Platonic analogy between the sun and the 
Idea of the Good is to liken discursive vision primarily oriented to the sensible to 
seeing in the dark: due to the absence of sufficient (intelligible or sensible) light, both 
are deficient modes of vision that fail to grasp the true determinate identity of what 
is seen and capture only perspectives or impressions (δόξαι).45 Seeing correctly 
(ὀρθῶς), i.e., directing one’s vision to that which is more (constant; μᾶλλον ὄν)46, 
presupposes that that which sees and that which is seen are connected under the 
“yoke” (ζυγόν) of proper illumination.47 The Platonic metaphysics of sight is thus a 
metaphysics of light, more precisely, a “solar” metaphysics of the ideal source of 
light—an “ontotheological” approach in the Heideggerian sense that all vision, all 
access to the presence of beings, is constantly referred back to a supreme and ideal 
“source” or “cause”:  
 
This highest and first cause [i.e., the Idea of the Good; J.B.] is named by Plato 
and correspondingly by Aristotle τὸ θεῖον, the divine. Ever since being [Sein] 
was interpreted as ἰδέα, thinking about the being of beings [Seienden] has been 
metaphysical, and metaphysics has been theological. In this case theology 
means the interpretation of the “cause” [Ursache] of beings as God and the 
transposition of being onto this cause, which contains being in itself and 
dispenses being from out of itself, because it is the most beingful [Seiendste] of 
beings.48 
 
                                                          
45 Plato, Republic, 508d4–9. 
46 Plato, Republic, 515d2–4. 
47 Plato, Republic, 507e6–508a2. 
48 Heidegger, Wegmarken, pp. 235–236; Pathmarks, pp. 180–181 (trans. Thomas Sheehan). Tr. mod. 
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2. Hearkening to the Voiceless Voice: Heraclitus’s Protometaphysics of Hearing 
In the light of Heidegger’s account of the profound complicity between the Platonic 
notion of Ideas and the paradigmatic status of vision, it is not surprising that traces of 
a metaphysics of sight are hard to find in pre-Platonic philosophy. Andrea Wilson 
Nightingale has shown that “in the pre-Platonic thinkers, there is little if any 
evidence that knowledge takes the form of ‘seeing’ truth. [. . .] The emphasis is on 
discourse and hearing rather than spectating or seeing.”49 A “physics” of sight did 
exist very early on; Empedocles and Democritus were among the first philosophers 
to develop optical and physiological accounts of the phenomenon of vision, 
described in detail in Theophrastus’s De sensibus.50 However, the use of optical 
metaphors in philosophical terminology was scarce, and there is no sign of any 
particular ontological primacy of seeing as a privileged mode of access to beings.  
The Heraclitus fragments tend to treat seeing and hearing as equally important 
senses. In his fragment B 55, Heraclitus tells us that he prefers (προτιμέω) things 
accessible to sight (ὄψις), hearing (ἀκοή), and learning (μάθησις)51—presumably to 
things that are not thus accessible. Fragment B 101a does suggest a certain primacy of 
sight: “For the eyes [ὀφθαλμοί] are more precise [ἀκριβέστεροι] witnesses than 
ears.”52 The quotation is by the Hellenistic historian Polybius, who comments: 
“Among our organs there are by nature two through which we learn all things and 
through which we are active in multiple ways, {hearing and sight}, and according to 
Heraclitus, sight is by far more truthful [ἀληθινώτερας].”53 It seems, however, that 
“truthful” is Polybius’s own interpretation of the greater precision attributed to sight 
                                                          
49 Andrea Wilson Nightingale, Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in Its Cultural 
Context (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 32–33. 
50 Theophrastus, De sensibus, in Doxographi Graeci, ed. Hermann Diels (Berlin, 1879), pp. 500–506, 513–
524. 
51 Heraclitus, 22 B 55, in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker: Griechisch und deutsch, ed. Hermann Diels and 
Walther Kranz, 6th ed., 1 (Berlin, 1951) [hereafter cited as DK]. 
52 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 101a. 
53 Polybius, Historiae, ed. Theodor Büttner-Wobst, 3 (Leipzig, 1893), 12.27.1. The words “hearing and 
sight” are a clarifying addition to the manuscript text by Alfred Fleckeisen. 
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by Heraclitus. The parallel status of seeing and hearing, as well as their 
subordination to λόγος, conceptual and discursive articulation, is evident from B 
107, “The eyes and ears of those possessing barbaric [βαρβάρους] souls are poor 
witnesses for human beings,”54 which Sextus Empiricus interprets convincingly: 
 
In terms of the knowledge [γνῶσιν] of truth, the human being seems to be 
arranged into two faculties: sensory perception and discursive articulation 
[λόγῳ]. Heraclitus considered sensory perception [. . .] to be unreliable and 
posited discursive articulation as a standard [κριτήριον]. But he rejected 
sensory perception, saying, as the phrase goes: “The eyes and ears… [B 107],” 
which amounts to saying that barbaric souls tend to trust inarticulate [ἀλόγοις] 
sensory perceptions.55 
 
As the onomatopoetic term indicates, the foreign speech of “barbarians” was 
regarded by the Greeks as inarticulate and garbled, and one can suppose that 
“barbaric souls” are “irrational” (ἄλογος) precisely in their inability to grasp the 
fundamental articulation of things in accordance with λόγος, the basic discursive 
structure of intelligibility. This lack of discursive and conceptual articulation—the 
lack of concordance with the “unapparent framework” (ἁρμονίη ἀφανής)56 that 
structures the “manifest” framework of sensory experience—impairs even their 
seeing and hearing, more precisely, their ability to make sense of their particular 
sensations by placing them into a wider discursive framework.  
Λόγος, discursive “reason,” articulates beings into basic pairs of binary 
conceptual opposites, such as freeman/slave, war/peace, divine/mortal, male/female, 
                                                          
54 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 107. 
55 Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos, in Sexti Empirici opera, ed. Hermann Mutschmann, 2 
(Leipzig, 1914), 7.126–127. 
56 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 54. 
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day/night, winter/summer, or living/dead.57 In these binaries, each term is 
conceptually dependent on its opposite: being free only makes sense in contrast to 
being a slave and vice versa, being male is meaningful only in distinction to being 
female, and so on. In this sense, λόγος is also the fundamental unity of discursive 
meaning: in their interdependency, all opposed terms inextricably belong together 
and intertwine with their opposites in a differential interplay. Λόγος lets all things 
belong together as differentiated. As the most perfect framework (καλλίστη 
ἁρμονία) it is an internally tensional (παλίντροπος) unity, like that of a bow or a 
lyre, that is, one emerging from the reciprocal agreement (ὁμολογεῖν) of differences 
or oppositions (διαφέροντα).58 As such, λόγος is universal and common (ξυνός) to 
all59, the divine law or norm (νόμος) governing all things.60 Interestingly, Heraclitus 
seems to compare λόγος to a “light” of intelligibility in fragment B 16: “How could 
one conceal oneself [λάθοι] from that which at no time sets [τὸ μὴ δῦνόν ποτε]?”61 
Clement of Alexandria interprets this from a Platonic or Neoplatonic perspective: 
while one can possibly remain concealed from sensuous [αἰσθητόν] light, in the case 
of purely intelligible, noetic [νοητόν] light, this is impossible.62  
However, in their normal and unreflected everyday mode of experiencing, 
human beings ignore this universal and law-like character of λόγος and pretend to 
possess a private and individual discursive capacity of their own.63 Just as in sleep 
one leaves the shared world for the private world of one’s dreams, humans turn their 
back to the common structure of rational thought even when awake64; they are 
“absent even in their presence.”65 To have a barbaric soul is to ignore the universality 
                                                          
57 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 53, 57, 60, 62, 67, 88, 111. 
58 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 8, 51.  
59 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 2, 114. 
60 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 33, 114. 
61 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 16. 
62 Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus, in Clementis Alexandrini opera, ed. Wilhelm Dindorf, 1 (Oxford, 
1869), 2.10.99. 
63 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 2. 
64 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 1, 26, 73, 89. 
65 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 34. 
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of conceptual discourse, to be deceptively focused on the contents of one’s private 
experience without placing them into a shared framework of rationality. This is what 
the problematic fragment B 46 seems to suggest: “[Heraclitus] called presumption 
[οἴησιν] the sacred disease [ἱερὰν νόσον] and said that vision [or: visible appearance, 
ὅρασιν] is deceptive.”66 Οἴησις ‘presumption’ has the double sense of ‘conjectural 
belief’ and ‘inflated self-confidence’; “the sacred disease” presumably refers here, as 
in later usage, to epileptic seizures, characterized by a temporary insensibility to 
external sounds or sights and compared by Aristotle to sleep.67 In sticking to one’s 
private experience, one is in a dreamlike state, cut off from the common world of 
logical organization and conceptual articulation, and one’s visual impressions 
become random, superficial, and deceptive. 
It seems that for Heraclitus, the value of visual perception as the most “precise 
witness” among human sensory faculties is entirely subordinate to logical and 
conceptual structure. “Precision” seems to refer to the superior capacity of sight to 
make distinctions and to differentiate its field, emphasized, as we saw, by Aristotle. 
However, B 7 seems to point out that this superiority is contingent upon the factual 
physical structure of the sensuous world: “If all beings were to turn to smoke, noses 
would make the distinctions [διαγνοῖεν],”68 that is, if the material world were 
different, some other sense, such as smell, could just as well be the most relevant 
source of differentiation. Thus, B 98 remarks, in the darkness of the nether world, the 
souls of the departed would have to orient themselves with the help of the sense of 
smell.69 The image of the world going up in smoke seems to be connected to 
Heraclitus’s use of fire as the elemental image of the fundamental unity and 
interchangeability of all things in λόγος. The sensuous world-order, the κόσμος, is 
                                                          
66 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 46. 
67 Aristotle, De somno et vigilia, in Parva naturalia, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford, 1955) 457a7–9. See also 
Emmanouil Magiorkinis, Kalliopi Sidiropoulou, and Aristidis Diamantis, “Hallmarks in the History of 
Epilepsy: Epilepsy in Antiquity,” Epilepsy & Behaviour 17 (2010), 103–108. 
68 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 7. 
69 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 98. 
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ultimately an ever-living fire70 in the sense that just as gold is the universal medium 
of exchange for goods, fire as the all-consuming element is a medium of exchange for 
all things.71 Clement tells us that as the fundamental element, the Heraclitean fire is 
organized by the λόγος that administers (διοικέω) the totality of beings;72 Hippolytus 
of Rome explains that everlasting fire is, for Heraclitus, the cause of the internal 
administration or “economy” (διοίκησις) of the totality of beings, and is itself capable 
of thought (φρόνιμον).73 Just as λόγος unites all things by differentiating them, fire 
distinguishes (κρινεῖ) and comprehends (καταλήψεται) all things.74 In this sense, the 
ever-living fire that always was, is, and will be, is the “never-setting light” that 
illuminates the world-order as a structured and measured totality.75  
Heraclitean “rationalism” thus leaves the bodily senses in a secondary and 
subordinate position. However, it is important to note that since λόγος is a 
discursive structure—and thus, in the Greek “phonocentric” perspective, primarily 
oral and spoken discourse—, there is a clear metaphorical primacy of hearing. 
Aristotle tells us that Heraclitus’s book began with these words: “For human beings 
are always unable to gather [ἀξύνετοι] the discursive articulation of being [τοῦ 
λόγου τοῦ ὄντος], before hearing [ἀκοῦσαι] it and even after they have first heard it 
[. . .].”76 In their normal unreflective ignorance of λόγος, humans are “inept at 
                                                          
70 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 30. 
71 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 90. 
72 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 31; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, in Clementis Alexandrini opera, ed. Wilhelm 
Dindorf, 3 (Oxford, 1869), 5.104. 
73 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 64; Hippolytus of Rome, Refutatio omnium haeresium (Philosophumena), ed. 
Miroslav Marcovich, (Patristische Texte und Studien) 25 (Berlin, 1986), 9.10.7. 
74 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 66. This quotation is from Hippolytus, who seems to read Heraclitus as a 
prophet of the final conflagration at the Biblical last judgment and therefore uses the future tense. 
However, there is no reason to suspect that these verbs are not identical to, or equivalent with, the 
ones actually used by Heraclitus. 
75 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 16, 30. Heidegger, in his commentary, suggests reading these fragments 
together, even though he himself reads the “never-setting light” in the sense of φύσις as constant 
“emergence-into-presence”; see Martin Heidegger, Heraklit, ed. Manfred S. Frings, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt 
am Main, 1994), p. 90. 
76 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 1; first lines quoted and commented in Aristotle, Rhetoric, ed. W. D. Ross 
(Oxford, 1959), 1407b14–18. The main manuscripts of Aristotle have τοῦ ὄντος, “(the λόγος) of being”; 
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hearing [ἀκοῦσαι] as well as saying [εἰπεῖν]”;77 even though they are constantly 
faced with λόγος, they are “deaf” (κωφοί) to it.78 And yet λόγος is not a voice, not 
the audible voice of a human being such as Heraclitus himself, but the voice, the 
voiceless voice of the discursive structure of being, the fundamental discursiveness 
that makes all rational discourse possible. “Having heard [ἀκούσαντας] not me but 
discursive articulation itself, it is well-advised to articulate in agreement [ὁμολογεῖν] 
with it: All is One [ἓν πάντα εἶναι].”79  
We find then, in Heraclitus, not a metaphysics of sight, not a noetic seeing of 
supersensible identities with the Platonic “eyes of the soul,”80 but rather a strangely 
analogous protometaphysics of hearing, characterized by an emphasis on listening to 
the “unapparent harmony,” the soundless discursive articulation of being that makes 
all merely human vocalization and speaking possible. In his Heraclitus lectures, 
Heidegger describes this hearing as an “authentic hearing”81 that he calls 
“hearkening” (Horchen): 
 
As auditory sensing [Empfinden], hearing [Hören] constantly takes place in terms 
of a listening [Hören auf] to something in the sense of hearkening [Horchens]. 
However, our hearkening is, in each case, already in itself in a certain way 
attentive [horchsam] to what is to be heard, prepared for it or unprepared as 
well—in some way, an obedience [Gehorsam]. Obedience is the ear required for 
proper hearing. The audible [das Hörbare], that which can be attentively 
perceived [Vernehmbare], need not be anything phonetic or noisy. [. . .] From 
Heraclitus’s saying we gather only that knowledge [Wissen] arises in attentive 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
a later variant, adopted by Diels and Kranz, is τοῦδ’ ἐόντος, “the present λόγος,” which would make 
the passage refer to Heraclitus’s own discourse. 
77 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 19. 
78 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 34. 
79 Heraclitus, DK 22 B 50. 
80 The expression is used, e.g., in Plato, Republic, 533d2. 
81 Heidegger, Heraklit, p. 246. 
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listening to the Λόγος, which, in contrast to the human discourse [Rede] of the 
thinker, is indeed not a vocalization [Verlautung] [. . .].82 
 
3. The Vision of Pure Presence: Parmenides’ Insight 
For a first indication of a metaphysics of sight, we will have to look at Parmenides. 
As Nightingale rightly points out, even the outset of Parmenides’ Poem is dominated 
by discourse and hearing, and by a general deprecation of the senses.83 In the 
opening of the Poem, which frames it in the imagery of Homeric and Hesiodic epic 
poetry, the narrator-thinker is carried in a divine carriage upon a “daimonic” path, 
that is, a mediating way between the mortal and the divine realms.84 In Sextus 
Empiricus’s highly interesting and not altogether implausible reading of the passage 
as an allegorical departure from sensory evidence, the screeching wheels on either 
side of the carriage are likened to the ears, while the “maidens of Sun” leading the 
way represent the eyes.85 In any case, the daimonic way leads the thinker beyond the 
“gates of the paths of Night and Day,” that is, beyond the most basic binary 
oppositions that constitute the discursively articulated and sensuous world of mortal 
experience, into the divine realm of fundamental unity.86 Here, the thinker is greeted 
by an anonymous goddess, who is rather unexpectedly not angered by the thinker’s 
transgression beyond the mortal realm but welcomes him and goes on to disclose her 
teaching, divided into two main parts: one concerning the fundamental truth, 
unconcealedness, or evidence (ἀλήθεια)87 regarding being, the other concerning the 
                                                          
82 Heidegger, Heraklit, p. 260. 
83 Nightingale, Spectacles of Truth, p. 33. 
84 Parmenides, DK 28 B 1.1–3, reading, with the manuscripts and Diels, δαίμονος ‘of a deity’ rather 
than δαίμονες ‘deities,’ preferred by Kranz. 
85 Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos, 7.112–113. 
86 Parmenides, DK 28 B 1.11–21. I follow here, in outline, the interpretation of Mitchell Miller, 
“Parmenides and the Disclosure of Being,” Apeiron 13 (1978), 12–35; “Ambiguity and Transport: 
Reflections on the Proem to Parmenides’ Poem,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 30 (2006), 1–47. 
87 On ἀλήθεια as “evidence,” see Ernst Heitsch, Parmenides: Die Fragmente: Griechisch und deutsch, 3rd 
ed. (Zürich, 1995), pp. 90–98. 
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views, impressions, or “acceptances” (δόξαι)88 of “mortals,” that is, of humans in 
their everyday, unreflective attitude, regarding being. Specifically, the purpose of the 
teaching is to show how the mortal acceptances inevitably arise and gain their 
relative justification or acceptability in terms of the “divine” level of evidence.89 The 
learning (πυθέσθαι) required of the thinker is of an explicitly acoustic nature: it 
consists in hearing (ἀκούσαι) the tale or narrative (μῦθος) related by the goddess90, 
and the part on Truth, the source of all true conviction and persuasion (πίστις, 
Πειθώ)91, is also referred to as a “convincing account” (πιστὸς λόγος).92 
Parmenides’ goddess is even more explicit than Heraclitus in her censure of 
reliance on the senses in the quest for fundamental evidence. The “mortals,” that is, 
human beings in their ordinary dealings with the world, are without insight in any 
respect (εἰδότες οὐδέν)93 regarding Ἀλήθεια; they are “deaf [κωφοί] as well as blind 
[τυφλοί]”94 precisely in that their scope is restricted to the situated and relative 
perspective of the senses in which things are either contingently there or not, are 
identical with themselves but different from all other things. They wander about 
“double-headed” (δίκρανοι)95 in the sense that they are constantly looking “in two 
directions,” at being (being-there, being-x) and at nonbeing (not-being-there, not-
being-y). For them, “ ‘to be there’ [πέλειν] and ‘not to be there’ [οὐκ εἶναι] are 
                                                          
88 On the δόξαι as “acceptances,” see Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides: A Study of 
Word, Image, and Argument in the Fragments (New Haven, CT, 1970), pp. 194–221. 
89 Parmenides, DK 28 B 1.22–32. The relationship between the Δόξαι and Ἀλήθεια has, of course, 
always been a highly disputed point. I follow here essentially the reading proposed by Hans Schwabl, 
“Sein und Doxa bei Parmenides,” Wiener Studien 66 (1953), 50–75, heavily influenced by Karl 
Reinhardt, Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie (Bonn, 1916), pp. 5–10. Reinhardt, 
who introduced the “phenomenological” reading that does not see Parmenides as simply rejecting the 
δόξαι but as inquiring into their necessary origin, was praised by Heidegger as the first one to 
properly grasp the correlation between the two parts of the Poem; see Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 
223n1; Being and Time, p. 214n39. 
90 Parmenides, DK 28 B 2.1, 8.1. 
91 Parmenides, DK 28 B 1.30, 2.4. 
92 Parmenides, DK 28 B 8.50. 
93 Parmenides, DK 28 B 6.4. 
94 Parmenides, DK 28 B 6.7. 
95 Parmenides, DK 28 B 6.5. 
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established as the same [ταὐτόν], and not the same.”96 Their thinking or awareness 
(νόος) of being is “errant” (πλακτός), directed by the “want of resources” 
(ἀμηχανίη) characteristic of bare sense perception. Because of this, they are 
“undecided” (ἄκριτα), that is, unable to make the crucial decision (κρίσις) between 
being and nonbeing.97 This is precisely what makes the mortal path oppositional and 
differential, “internally tensional” (παλίντροπος, which some scholars have read as 
a direct reference to Heraclitus’s παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη).98 Therefore, the goddess 
admonishes the thinker, it is essential not to let oneself be forced by habit (ἔθος) on 
the “path of much experience” (πολύπειρος ὁδός) upon which one “observes the 
unwatchful eye [ἄσκοπον ὄμμα] and the roaring hearing [ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν], and 
the tongue [γλῶσσαν].” Rather, the fundamental decision is to be made by purely 
conceptual and discursive means (κρῖναι λόγῳ).99 
However natural and meaningful the “internally tensional” mortal experience 
of “is and is not” may be, the goddess’s central teaching on ἀλήθεια aims to show 
that it must be reduced to a fundamental unity of being. This thesis is essentially 
based on the “purification” of thinking awareness from its “errant” mortal character, 
which entails its release from the “errancy” of the senses. From the point of view of 
Parmenides’ epistemology, the enigmatic fragment B 16 is particularly interesting: 
 
For in whatever way [the human being] is, in each case, disposed as to the 
compound of much-erring limbs [μελέων πολυπλάγκτων], 
thinking [νόος] becomes available to humans accordingly. For it is the same [τὸ 
γὰρ αὐτό], 
                                                          
96 Parmenides, DK 28 B 6.8–9. 
97 Parmenides, DK 28 B 6.5–7. On Parmenides’ decision or “crisis,” see Jussi Backman, “Unity in Crisis: 
Protometaphysical and Postmetaphysical Decisions,” in Politics of the One: Concepts of the One and the 
Many in Contemporary Thought, ed. Artemy Magun (New York, 2013), pp. 87–112. 
98 Parmenides, DK 28 B 6.8–9. On παλίντροπος as a reference to Heraclitus, DK 22 B 51, see Alois 
Patin, Parmenides im Kampfe gegen Heraklit, (Jahrbücher für classische Philologie, Suppl.) 25 (Leipzig, 
1899), pp. 524–527. 
99 Parmenides, DK 28 B 7.3–5. 
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that which the nature [φύσις] of the limbs precisely minds [φρονέει], for 
humans, 
for all and each. For a thought [νόημα] is what goes over and above this [or: 
what is fulfilled, τὸ πλέον].100 
 
Aristotle quotes this passage to support his claim that Parmenides and many of the 
other Presocratics failed to make the Platonic distinction between the sensuous and 
the intelligible, considering all awareness to be sensory in nature.101 The original 
context of the passage is left obscure. Aristotle’s pupil Theophrastus quotes the same 
passage in his treatise on sensation, reading it as a part of an elaborate physiological 
theory of sensation he attributes to Parmenides.102 However, he does not really 
interpret the passage, and its connection to the theory he describes, allegedly found 
in the Δόξαι part of the Poem, remains somewhat obscure.103 While the majority of 
scholars—Heidegger among them104—have followed Theophrastus’s interpretation 
and placed B 16 among the Δόξαι fragments, it is possible to read it instead as part of 
the goddess’s main argument:105 it seems that she is here explaining how mortal 
                                                          
100 Parmenides, DK 28 B 16, interpreting the notoriously ambiguous lines 16.2–3 with Tarán and 
Mourelatos; see Leonardo Tarán, Parmenides: A Text with Translation, Commentary, and Critical Essays 
(Princeton, NJ, 1965), pp. 253–256; Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides, pp. 253–259.  
101 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1009b12–1010a15; see also De anima, 427a17–b6. 
102 Theophrastus, De sensu et sensibilibus (Doxographi Graeci, pp. 499–500). 
103 On the problems in Theophrastus’s readings of Presocratic philosophy, the questionability of his 
source material and his dependence on Aristotle, see Ian McDiarmid, “Theophrastus on the 
Presocratic Causes,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 61 (1953), 85–156; Hermann Fränkel, Wege 
und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens: Literarische und philosophiegeschichtliche Studien (Munich, 1955), pp. 
175–176; Jackson P. Hershbell, “Parmenides’ Way of Truth and B 16,” Apeiron 4 (1970), 3–9; Barbara 
Cassin and Michel Narcy, “Parménide sophiste: la citation aristotélicienne du fr. XVI,” in Études sur 
Parménide, 2: Problèmes d’interprétation, ed. Pierre Aubenque (Paris, 1987), pp. 280–281. 
104 Heidegger, Der Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie: Auslegung des Anaximander und Parmenides, 
ed. Peter Trawny (Frankfurt am Main, 2012), pp. 192–194. 
105 It is noteworthy that unlike the other preserved Δόξαι fragments, B 16 is not focused on any binary 
opposition of the natural world. We should also note that Aristotle (Metaphysics 1009b33–1010a3) 
explicitly associates the passage with ἀλήθεια; cf. Cassin and Narcy, “Parménide sophiste,” pp. 277–
293. For readings of B 16 in the context of the Ἀλήθεια part, see, e.g., Hershbell, “Parmenides’ Way of 
Truth and B 16,” 1–23; David Gallop, Parmenides of Elea: Fragments: A Text and Translation with an 
Introduction, (Phoenix Suppl.) 18 (Toronto, 1984), pp. 22, 37, 87. 
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awareness can be “errant,” that is, oriented to the shifting circumstances of particular 
situations. For the human being, all awareness is fundamentally embodied and thus 
bound to the particular disposition of the body; humans therefore first and foremost 
apprehend the situated and contingent objects of the bodily senses. But regardless of 
these particular objects of sensation, what is fundamentally “minded” and grasped in 
each situation is the one and the same reality (τὸ γὰρ αὐτό)—that is, the “being 
there” of the things as such. This basic “thereness” is the dimension that, in an actual 
act of awareness (νόημα), goes “over and above” all situated perceiving (or: “fulfills” 
all situated apprehending). 
Even though thinking awareness, νόος, is not, for Parmenides, a faculty 
separate from the bodily senses but always embodied and situated, it is capable of 
looking away from particular things and of becoming aware of the fundamental 
identity of all things in their “thereness,” their givenness to awareness as such—that 
is, their presence. For thinking in the sense of immediate awareness of things, there is 
ultimately only presence. This is what fragment B 4 explicitly states: 
 
See [λεῦσσε], all alike, absent things [ἀπεόντα] as firmly present [παρεόντα] to 
thinking [νόῳ]; 
for it [thinking] will not cut off being [τὸ ἐόν] from holding to being, 
neither as dispersed in every way and entirely, along a world order [κόσμον], 
nor as assembled.106 
 
What is “absent” in the ordinary sense of the spatial or temporal absence of a 
particular thing is present insofar as it can be meaningfully thought, that is, intended 
in thinking and named in discourse—that is, insofar as it is intelligible. As Guido 
Calogero puts it: “[F]or Parmenides, it is in reality one single concept: if the 
possibility of being is for him, unwittingly, its intelligibility [pensabilità], its 
                                                          
106 Parmenides, DK 28 B 4.  
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intelligibility, in turn, is its expressibility.”107 Unlike Plato, Parmenides does not 
separate intelligibility into a realm of its own, apart from its particular 
spatiotemporal instances. Rather, he regards all particular intelligible things as 
modifications of intelligibility as such. 
We should pay close attention to the first word of this fragment: λεῦσσε ‘look,’ 
‘gaze,’ ‘behold.’ This is one of the very rare instances in pre-Platonic texts of an 
explicitly visual metaphor for an intellectual act of apprehending; it is therefore 
rather surprising that Heidegger does not pay very much attention to this passage or 
to B 4 in general.108 The context is highly significant. The primary task of the learning 
thinker is to listen to the goddess’s narrative account about ἀλήθεια, δόξαι, and their 
mutual relationship; yet in order to convey her central argument for the transition 
from mortal δόξαι to the pure intelligible evidence of ἀλήθεια, the goddess resorts to 
the language of vision, exhorting her hearer to look upon or spectate the pure and 
absolute presence of all intelligible things to thinking in the sense of meaningful 
intending, as opposed to the relative presence and relative absence encountered by 
the “erring” senses. Significantly, the verb λεύσσω is defined by R. A. Prier as a 
“clear” kind of seeing or beholding that often “describes how a mortal views 
immortal phenomena” and implies a special, transformative experience.109 
With this visual insight, the internally tensional path of the mortals breaks 
apart. Pure thinking awareness will not tolerate the internal tension of “there is and 
there is not”, but leaves the thinker only two alternative ways: the way of the 
                                                          
107 Guido Calogero, Studi sull’eleatismo (Rome, 1932), p. 18. Barrington Jones notes that for Parmenides 
“‘things that are’ and ‘objects of thought’ are co-extensive” and argues that the whole argument of B 4 
“applies [. . .] to all those mental phenomena which admit, to one degree or another, of a 
characterization in terms of ‘intensional inexistence’ [. . .].” Jones, “Parmenides’ ‘The Way of Truth’,” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 11 (1973), 291, 294. 
108 For Heidegger’s references to Parmenides, DK 28 B 4, see Heidegger, Phänomenologische 
Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik, pp. 220–221; Der 
Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie, pp. 174–180; Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie, ed. Franz-
Karl Blust (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), pp. 65–66; The Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy, trans. Richard 
Rojcewicz (Bloomington, IN, 2008), pp. 54–55. 
109 Raymond Adolph Prier, Thauma Idesthai: The Phenomenology of Sight and Appearance in Archaic Greek 
(Tallahassee, FL, 1989), pp. 68–71. 
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absolute “there is” (absolute presence, absolute intelligibility) or the way of the 
absolute “there is not” (absolute nonpresence, absolute nonintelligibility).110 But the 
choice between these is no true choice. The insight developed in B 16 and B 4 is that 
thinking as such is simply reception of intelligible presence and that being-there as 
such is simply the givenness of intelligible presence to awareness. Thinking and 
being-there thus coincide. As the two key aspects of one and the same intelligibility, 
as receptivity and givenness, thinking (νοεῖν) and being (εἶναι) are one and the same 
(τὸ γὰρ αὐτό).111 Thinking is defined by being exclusively bound to presence and 
excluded from nonpresence. What can be articulated in discourse (λέγειν) and 
apprehended in thinking (νοεῖν) is simply the “thereness” of intelligible presence; 
what is not is simply and absolutely nothing, not even one (μηδέν), beyond any kind 
of intellectual grasping or verbal expression.112  
The “decision” between “there is” and “there is not” has thus always already 
been decided (κέκριται): “there is not” is to be left alone as unintelligible (ἀνόητον) 
and nameless (ἀνώνυμον).113 “Only one account of a way still remains: how there is 
[ὡς ἔστιν].”114 This way is then articulated by the goddess in the long fragment B 8, 
the heart of the Ἀλήθεια part of the Poem, yielding the famous “indications” 
(σήματα) of being as intelligible presence: absolutely identical with itself, absolutely 
devoid of any internal or external differentiation or opposition, absolutely simple, 
self-sufficient, self-contained, homogeneous, and unique. In a word, presence as such 
is one in all the central senses of the term, and as such, it is pure temporal presence. In 
the absolute sense, one can never say “there was” or “there will be”; rather, there 
simply is now (νῦν ἔστιν), “all at once [ὁμοῦ πᾶν], unitarily [ἕν], constantly 
[συνεχές].”115 At the end of the fragment, the goddess makes the transition from 
                                                          
110 Parmenides, DK 28 B 2.1–5.  
111 Parmenides, DK 28 B 3; 8.34–36. 
112 Parmenides, DK 28 B 6.1–2; 2.7–8.  
113 Parmenides, DK 28 B 8.15–18. 
114 Parmenides, DK 28 B 8.1–2. 
115 Parmenides, DK 28 B 8.5–6. 
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Ἀλήθεια to the Δόξαι in the form of a brief genealogy of the mortal acceptances. The 
acceptances arise together with discourse and conceptuality when mortals 
“establish” the binary oppositions, attaching names to notions of which one can 
never function without the other, thus differentiating the unity of being into a basic 
duality.116 On the basis of the few remaining Δόξαι fragments, it seems clear that this 
“cosmological” part of the Poem was concerned purely with the fundamental binary 
opposites of sensuous nature: light/night, warm/cold, right/left, and male/female.117 
Like the Heraclitus fragments, the Poem of Parmenides fundamentally seeks to 
unfold the ultimate unity of these opposites; however, this unity is not discovered in 
the differentiating-unifying structure of λόγος, of “the voiceless voice” that thinking 
must hearken to, but in the prediscursive intendability and intelligibility of things, in 
the very meaningful accessibility of being that puts it within the reach of discursive 
articulation. This basic level of evidence is best glimpsed, as we have seen, through a 
vision of pure presence that is to guide the hearing of the goddess’s oral account. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Let us conclude our tentative genealogy. We can see that both Heraclitus and 
Parmenides seek a way out of the duality of the discursive binary oppositions that, 
according to Aristotle, dominated the early philosophy of nature;118 they look for an 
ultimate unity beyond the contrarieties of discursively articulated being. As 
Heidegger shows, both are essentially thinkers of ἕν, of the unifying one.119 However, 
we have seen that they locate this fundamental unity differently. Heraclitus discovers 
it in the differentiating structure of discursive and conceptual articulation itself—as 
differentiating, discursiveness also precisely unifies in making the opposites 
interdependent moments of the “internally tensional” framework that is a perfect 
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“harmony” or concord precisely because of this tension or difference. The insight 
into this unity-in-difference of intelligibility is thus brought about by hearing, by 
listening to the articulated unity of this discursive intelligibility as such. For 
Parmenides, however, the unity of intelligibility is one that precedes all differences 
and oppositions. It is found in the capacity of thinking to intend all things as equally 
intelligible, and since such intending can only encounter pure presence without 
absence, it is most fruitfully “visualized” in terms of looking: it is just as impossible 
to look at something absent as it is to think the unintelligible. 
The Platonic metaphysics of sight thus turns out, in a sense, to be a synthesis of 
the Heraclitean protometaphysics of hearing and the Parmenidean protometaphysics 
of looking. Platonic noetic vision is no longer the look of Parmenides, which 
encounters presence prior to its articulation, but rather a looking permeated by the 
audible λόγος, one that sees precisely the determinate identities conferred to things 
by concepts and names, and sees things in the light of these identities. The “names” 
which, as the apparent conclusion of the Δόξαι part of Parmenides’ Poem puts it, 
were conferred by human beings upon being in order to distinguish one being from 
another and which thus produce the ordered world of discursive “acceptances,”120 
become the Heraclitean “divine law” of λόγος—the mediating “audible” structure 
through which “visible” presence can gain determinacy and constancy.121 
                                                          
120 Parmenides, DK 28 B 19.  
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